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Abstract
Placebo-trials on HIV-infected pregnant women in developing countries like Thailand and Uganda have provoked recent controversy.
Such experiments aim to find a treatment that will cut the rate of vertical transmission more efficiently than existing treatments like
zidovudine. This scenario is first stated as generally as possible, before three ethical principles found in the Belmont Report, itself a
sharpening of the Helsinki Declaration, are stated. These three principles are the Principle of Utility, the Principle of Autonomy and the
Principle of Justice. These are taken as voices of moral imperative. But although each has intuitive appeal, it can be shown that there are
possible scenarios in which they give conflicting prescriptions. To achieve consistency, one must be subordinate to the others. The voice of
utility is taken as subordinate to those of justice and autonomy and it is shown that given plausible assumptions about the level of poverty
and education in the developing country targeted, the experiment is ruled morally wrong in the name of both justice and autonomy.
Moreover, it is argued that no justification can be found for the inclusion of a placebo group, when strictly defined. By contrast, a ‘no-
treatment’ control arm might be justified, but only when the demands of autonomy are satisfied, demands that are more stringent than they
might appear. A utilitarian defence of the experiment is examined, namely that the would-be participants are in a no-loss situation, and it
is shown that this defence is seriously flawed. Finally, it is concluded that there is no justification for amending the Declaration of Helsinki.
Ann Acad Med Singapore 2000; 29:557-62
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Introduction
Placebo-trials on HIV-infected pregnant women in
developing countries like Thailand and Uganda1,2 have
provoked recent controversy.3,4 Such experiments aim to
find a treatment that will cut the rate of vertical transmission
more efficiently than existing ‘gold standard’ treatments
like zidovudine. Is such an experiment morally justified? I
think that the right question to ask is this: “Is it always,
never or sometimes, morally justified to experiment on
HIV-infected, pregnant women in developing countries
(by means of placebo trials) in order to develop a new
treatment X which will reduce the rate of mother-to-child
HIV transmission more effectively than the existing (‘gold
standard’) treatment Y?”
Three Ethical Principles and How They Conflict
Put like this, the issue acquires a level of generality. For
example, the specific country in which the experiment is
carried out is not the issue. Unless there are clear differences
from country to country which are morally relevant to the
question above, our answer to it should be the same
whatever the country in which such experiments are
conducted.
Extracting a clear and consistent answer is not easy,
given the emotional horror that surrounds even a suitably
generalised question. The consequences of the disease are
horrible and threaten to multiply through successive
generations. The horror is accentuated by the innocence of
the foetus as a recipient of those consequences, an innocence
that remains regardless of the academic question of whether
the foetus is a person or merely a potential person. Add to
this the perplexing conundrum of placebo, with its levels of
ignorance. Finally, we must contextualise the problem
against the background of the horrors built into developing
countries, such as unequal and inadequate resources, lack
of education and poverty.
Where is a doctor or a researcher to look for guidance in
such a case? ‘Conscience’, isn’t any substantive answer,
since differing consciences of doctors are just differing
internalisations of some medical code. However, there is
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an authoritative code of medical practice, which provides
guidance, namely the Belmont Report.5
The Belmont Report provides an excellent sharpening of
the principles laid down in the unmodified Helsinki
Declaration.6 In essence, it urges three principles: the
Principle of Utility (there called Beneficence), the Principle
of Autonomy (there called Respect for Persons) and the
Principle of Justice.
The Principle of Utility has a negative and a positive
form. Its negative form states that
PB neg) It is one’s duty to refrain from doing harm
while its positive states that
PB pos) It is one’s duty to minimise harm and
maximise benefit, to society in general,
including that of future patients.
The Principle of Autonomy claims that individuals should
be treated as autonomous agents, and that persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection. In other
words,
PA) It is one’s duty to respect autonomous choices
and to protect those with diminished
autonomy.
The Principle of Justice states that ‘research should not
unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among
the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research’.
The spirit of this principle is that
PJ) It is one’s duty to distribute benefits (of
research) fairly
or at least, not worsen the imbalance of benefits and
burdens of research among relevant groups.
These three voices of utility, autonomy and justice cannot,
in themselves, provide clear guidance in all cases, since
there are possible scenarios in which they give conflicting
rulings. It seems reasonable to think that the negative voice
of utility is not a total prohibition of any form of harm, such
as a slightly painful injection. Rather it should be read as
‘Do not cause more harm than benefit to a single individual’,
but this may still conflict with the positive voice of utility.
Suppose that the general increase of good over harm to
society in general (by means of a reduction of the number
of children who will be born with HIV) can be purchased
only at the cost of exposing the mothers in the experimental
group to a risk of substantial harm that is greater than the
chance of slight benefit. Since such exposure is itself a type
of harm, the voice of utility is confused.
Now consider the cost to the mothers in the control
group. Their babies are effectively condemned to HIV
infection, the incidence of which could have been reduced
by giving them the ‘gold standard’ standard treatment Y
(for example, zidovudine) that is known to be effective in
cutting the rate of vertical HIV transmission. In the name
of both babies and their mothers, the negative voice of
utility prohibits the experiment, while its positive voice
demands it. Suppose further that HIV-infected mothers can
only be recruited for the experiment by coercing them to
participate or by withholding information about the risks
involved (the absence of any effective treatment in the case
of the control group and the risks-compared-to-benefits of
treatment X in the case of the experimental group) relative
to the benefits available to others (by means of the existing
treatment Y). Here the voice of utility contradicts that of
autonomy, since informed and free choice to participate
has been ruled out. Or suppose that the treatment X, once
available, will be restricted to a minority of HIV-infected
pregnant women in countries wealthy enough to afford it,
excluding those in the developing country in which they
were originally developed. Even if we could be sure that
the rate of vertical transmission would decrease world-
wide, in line with the voice of utility, we would still hear the
cry of injustice.
One Hierarchy of the Three Ethical Principles
These examples show that the principle of utility will
contradict those of autonomy and justice in cases that are
at least possible. This means that we must decide in
advance which voice has authority over which. As a matter
of fact, most of us hear the least authority in the voice of
utility. In examples such as those just considered, most will
judge that maximising utility at the cost of injustice or at the
cost of disrespecting the free choices of people (thus
treating them as means to the end of increased health
world-wide) is morally repugnant. Thus, one way to achieve
consistency among the three principles that will fit the
moral intuitions of many is to hold that the voice of utility
must be obeyed, but only after the voices of justice and
autonomy have been obeyed. Those who hear things that
way will not be swayed in the least by the tinkering with the
original wording of the Helsinki Declaration which was
sent to the World Medical Association’s member
associations in advance of the World Medical Association
Council Session in Santiago, Chile on April 15, 1999.
Working from the background of the question towards
empirical specifics, the Principle of Justice is the most
effective choice of principles to apply first. If the degree of
poverty of most pregnant HIV-infected mothers in the
developing country (such as Uganda) will prevent them
from buying the improved cure, if found, for several
generations of HIV-infected offspring to come, while most
of the relatives of the researchers (such as Americans) will
be able to buy it as soon as it hits the market, then surely this
is injustice. As for other scenarios, surely enlarging the
relative size of burdened group versus benefiting group
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proportionally worsens the injustice. Given that injustice
will be done, there is something morally wrong with the
experiment, quite regardless of whatever else is ruled
wrong by the other principles. Taking the three principles
as a guide to procedure, we must at least postpone such
experiments until enough economic aid has been given to
these countries as makes the chances of benefit more fairly
distributed. Otherwise the researchers should experiment
upon their own extended geo-political-economic kin. Given
the commercial hegemony of the rich drug companies
involved, their opposition to the production of cheaper
‘generic’ drugs and the huge disparity between levels of
wealth in developing countries and developed countries,
the chances of benefit to the burdened group were clearly
not fairly available to them.
Let us now suppose (hypothetically but implausibly) that
equality has been redressed or is not the issue. What does
the voice of autonomy tell us? There are two groups for
whom it could speak, the foetuses and their mothers.
Clearly the foetus is incapable of making choices, informed
or not, so whether or not we say that they are potential
persons or already persons, there can be no autonomous
choices made by them which are respected or disrespected.
In this respect, the voice of autonomy is neutral on the
permissibility of the experiment. On the other hand, the
principle of autonomy also commands us to ‘protect those
with diminished autonomy’, which appears to include the
foetus. If so, on balance, the voice of autonomy prohibits
the experiment in the name of the foetus.
It might be objected that the class of those entitled to
protection excludes non-persons such as the foetus. This
objection clearly has little bite against those who hold that
the foetus is to some degree a person at some stage in its
development. Nor is it persuasive against those, including
the mothers, who think that whether the foetus is an actual
or potential person, it is still something valuable, which
therefore needs protection.
How does autonomy speak for the mothers? It clearly
prohibits the experiment unless the mother has made an
autonomous choice to participate. Autonomous choices
must be informed choices. In the case of a non-placebo
experiment in which the new treatment X is to be tested,
this means that the mother must understand the risks and
probable benefits to herself and her foetus posed by the new
treatment X, as compared to risks and probable benefits
conferred by the existing treatment Y. Since the probability
of risks and benefits of the new treatment may be precisely
what the experiment is designed to discover, it may not be
possible to give her precisely this information. In that case,
the mother must be informed of the degree of uncertainty
of the probability of possible harms and benefits of the new
treatment X, as compared to the degree of certainty already
established of the probabilities of harms and benefits of the
existing treatment Y. Anything less would not be full
information.
Complications Arising from Placebo Control
In the case of a placebo experiment, things are more
complicated. Placebos aim to separate the causal powers of
X from the causal powers of the belief in those causal
powers. For example, they aim to filter out cases in which
a patient feels better simply because that patient believes
(correctly or incorrectly) that the treatment will work. The
belief in question may be held by the mothers or the
experimenters or both. Clearly no such belief can be held
by the foetus. Assume a simple single-blind placebo control
in which each mother has a fifty-fifty chance of being
selected for the control group to receive sugar as opposed
to the experimental group to receive the new treatment X,
such that no mother will know which group she is in.
Obviously, this design of experiment rules out informing
the mothers which group they are in, but this does not mean
they can be given no information at all. Autonomy demands
that each mother understand that she has a half-chance of
ending up in the control group, in which case her foetus will
certainly be born with HIV and a half-chance of ending up
in the experimental group, with possible risks and benefits
to the foetus which are uncertain. She must also understand
that she faces these two outcomes in the teeth of the
knowledge that treatment Y already exists, with its more
certain risks and benefits to the foetus.
It might be objected here that the lack of education
among such mothers renders them incapable of
understanding such information. If so, autonomy demands
that education be a more pressing priority than medical
research. The experiment must be postponed until the
would-be participants are educated to a level that enables
them to understand what choices are open to them. Since
justice demands that the benefits of education be fairly
distributed throughout the developing country in which the
experiment is to take place, this means that the experiment
must be postponed until any would-be sub-group of
participants has a level of education that is representative
of the whole population of that country.
This brings us back to the purpose of the placebo.
Suppose that an HIV-infected pregnant woman believes
that she is receiving a new miracle drug that carries an
ironclad guarantee of protecting her foetus from infection.
In fact her belief is mistaken, for the drug she has been
given is just sugar. It seems unlikely that her belief could
have any positive psychological effect upon her foetus. In
terms of the mother, the placebo seems to serve no useful
purpose. So far, there is no justification for the creation of
the control group, in which the foetuses are condemned to
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HIV infection. Thus the only other purpose that the placebo
can serve is to separate the causal powers of X in reducing
vertical transmission from the causal powers of the beliefs
of the experimenters. A double-blind trial, in which the
experimenters do not know which mother is receiving
sugar or receiving X, will ensure that they will not bias the
development of one group of foetuses over the other, by
giving different levels of care to the two groups of mothers.
The question to ask now is whether the increased accuracy
of the results of the efficiency of X is worth the price of
allowing the mothers in the control group to go untreated.
The voice of autonomy tells us that the price need not be
paid. Since mothers in both groups are persons equally
deserving of care and respect, the experimenters have a
duty to provide both groups with the best possible level of
care, regardless of their beliefs about whose foetuses are
most likely to be protected from vertical transmission.
Once this duty is discharged, there is no possible justification
left for the inclusion of the placebo group.
Thus there appears to be no need for a placebo group at
all. Surely the ethical procedure would be to give the
control group treatment Y instead. After all, are we not
trying to measure the difference in effectiveness of the new
treatment X as compared to the existing treatment Y? If the
participants in both groups were fully informed of the
experimental set-up, there would be no room for objection
on grounds of autonomy, nor any room for objection on
grounds of utility to the treatment of the participants in the
control group, since this group is assured of the best known
treatment available anyway.
Given my definition of a placebo as a control which aims
to separate the causal powers of a treatment from the causal
powers of belief (or faith) in that treatment, there is, strictly
speaking, a conceptual difference between a placebo group
and a ‘no treatment’ control group, which aims to help
isolate possible unwanted side-effects of the treatment. In
experiments to develop new treatments that are more
effective in reducing the vertical transmission of HIV, a ‘no
treatment group’ would help to isolate unwanted side-
effects of the new treatment on the foetus. I now turn to this
issue.
‘No-Treatment Groups’ within Controlled Studies
Similar moral objections can be made to different kinds
of experiments such as the Rakai project in Uganda,7 in
which the experimenters studied the effect of other sexually
transmitted diseases on the rate of heterosexual transmission
of HIV and the natural risk factors that determine the
heterosexual transmission of HIV-1 over periods of
unprotected sex. Such experiments use a ‘no-treatment’
group within a controlled study. Such an experiment is
ruled unethical on the grounds of autonomy, if those who
were left untreated were not fully informed that this was
precisely what would happen to them. By the experimenters’
own admission, those in the ‘no-treatment’ group were not
fully informed. Quinn et al8 reported that 228 HIV-infected
couples were left untreated for up to thirty months, and the
decision to inform the uninfected persons that their partner
was infected was left up to the infected persons themselves,
although the experimenters regularly saw both. Surely this
does not count as discharging a duty to give all parties
concerned the full information. To so discharge it, the
experimenters should have told each couple that one partner
was infected as well as telling them that the infection would
go untreated.
In the same project, the investigators treated half of the
villagers for sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis
while leaving the other half untreated. Their aim was to
determine the effect of concurrent sexually transmitted
diseases on the heterosexual transmission rate of HIV.
Assume for the sake of argument, that this information was
obtained and that it helped to develop more effective ways
of cutting the HIV transmission rate. In terms of maximising
the utility to society in general, the investigators were
morally justified. Moreover, anyone who maintains
consistently that the voice of utility always overrides the
voices of autonomy and justice can defend the investigators,
but that is not the moral framework I have suggested. Given
that utility is subordinate to autonomy and justice, we need
to ask whether the investigators infringed the informed
choices of the villagers who were left untreated. Deciding
this is not easy. One way to look at it is to say that the
untreated villagers were simply left alone by the
investigators to carry on as before, so no interference took
place. On the other hand, there is a clear sense in which the
untreated villagers were selected by the investigators to
form one half of the experiment. In this sense, they were
intentionally included in the experiment by default.
Therefore the voice of autonomy demands that the
experimenters give them an informed choice to continue to
participate, which in turn means telling them that they
would go untreated. Had the villagers heroically agreed to
forgo treatment for the sake of future generations then there
could be no objection in the name of autonomy. Otherwise,
continuing to include them in the experiment would be
morally wrong. Against this, it might be objected that the
investigators were not doing anything extraordinary, since
the villagers would not have been treated in the ordinary
course of events anyway. However, it is not so clear that
this means the investigators were not interfering. Given
that the investigators selected this particular group of
villagers for the control arm of the experiment, and then
continued to withhold both treatment and information
when they could easily have supplied both, were they not
interfering? In selecting and then ignoring them, surely the
investigators were actually doing something to them.
September 2000, Vol. 29 No. 5
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The scenario of the untreated villagers is no different in
principle from that in which a group of pregnant HIV-
infected mothers is left untreated as a control to a second
group who are given a new treatment X, in order to help
obtain information on (among other things) whether X will
have unwanted side-effects on the foetus. Assume, for the
sake of argument, that the information is obtained and that
it is instrumental in reducing harmful side-effects to babies
who are in general, less likely to be born with HIV (than
when their mothers were treated with the original drug Y).
Again, the voice of utility permits, even demands, the
inclusion of the ‘no-treatment group’, but again, given that
utility is subordinate to autonomy and justice, we need to
ask whether the investigators infringed the informed choices
of the mothers who were left untreated. If the investigators
first selected them as a control arm and then withheld
treatment and information (including the information that
they were infected and that treatment was available), then
the mothers’ autonomy was violated.
The Utilitarian ‘No Loss’ Defence
Some commentators9 in the debate have argued that most
HIV-infected pregnant women in developing countries
would not be able to afford any sort of treatment against
vertical transmission anyway. Thus the women in the
original experiment are in a no-loss situation. They have a
half-chance of ending up in the placebo group, in which
case they are no worse off than they would be anyway and
a half-chance of ending up in the experimental group, in
which case they have a secondary chance (the degree of
which is yet unknown) of protecting their foetus.
This argument suffers from a number of flaws. Are the
women in the placebo group really no worse off than they
would have been had they never participated? If autonomy
has been satisfied, then the women will know that they are
in a kind of desperate lottery that holds out a chance for the
well-being of their unborn. Since the chances of protection
for the foetuses in the experimental group are less than
certain, they should know that overall, the odds are against
them. Nonetheless, some basis for hope exists, which
may well be the very reason why they have agreed to
participate. Yet the experimenters know in advance that
for each mother in the placebo group, all hope will be
dashed. This burden of false hope and its certain
disappointment surely represents a significant cost to this
group of mothers.
The no-loss argument gains its plausibility from the
claim that the personal utility of the volunteers is not
decreased. But it ignores the salient fact that the volunteers
start from a position of inequality. Were justice done, the
proven, if limited benefits of the existing treatment Y
would be distributed fairly throughout the world to those in
developing countries who need them most. Given that the
inclusion of the placebo group is justified, the autonomous
choice of the mothers would then be the more heroic one of
taking a half-chance of no protection for their unborn and
a half-chance of the uncertain degree of protection conferred
by treatment X, in preference to the guarantee of the certain
but limited degree of protection conferred by the existing
treatment Y. Given, as I suggested above, that the inclusion
of the placebo group is not justified, the autonomous choice
of the mothers would then be the less heroic but still
courageous one of trading the certain but limited degree of
protection conferred by treatment Y for the possibly
improved but uncertain degree of protection conferred
by treatment X.
In the original experiment, even those mothers who end
up in the experimental group are doubly wronged. Firstly,
they are wronged both in the name of justice and in the
name of autonomy by being unfairly denied the choice of
treatment Y. Then the experimenters restrict their choices
to the options of no treatment (by refusing to participate) or
the option of a half-chance of the uncertain benefits of
treatment X (by consenting to participate). The restriction
is genuine, since it is always within the power of
experimenters to offer treatment Y as well. Since this is a
perpetuation of the original injustice and an erosion of
autonomy, this is a further wrong. In this respect, the
would-be participant resembles a workman who has been
unfairly denied any payment. His employer offers to toss
a coin. If the coin comes down heads, the workman will
receive half his wages; if tails, nothing. If he refuses the bet,
again he gets nothing. The workman is first wronged by
being deprived any payment. When the bet is offered, he
has nothing further to lose. Yet surely the offer of the
bet is a second wrong since it perpetuates the original
deprivation of full payment, one that the employer is in a
position to put right.
Effects of Modifying the Declaration of Helsinki
Whereas the current Declaration assures research
participants of ‘the best proven diagnostic and therapeutic
method,’ the corresponding section in the modified
Declaration adds the phrase ‘that would otherwise be
available to him or her.’ This appears to vindicate the ‘no
loss’ argument, since there is no treatment available to the
would-be participants in the experiment should they not
participate, given that they are too poor to afford any
treatment, including treatment Y. But this vindication is an
illusion. For one thing, there is an ambiguity in the phrase
‘available’. On one reading, treatment Y is not available to
the group in the sense that they would not have been able
to obtain it, had they never come in contact with the
experimenters. However, in that sense, since the best
treatment available otherwise is none, this amendment is
just another way of saying that the group in question is
562
Annals Academy of Medicine
Ethics of Anti-HIV Trials in Developing Countries—J N Williams
assured of no treatment. We should therefore reject this
amendment to the Declaration, in the name of both justice
and utility as originally voiced by it. Utility demands that
the benefit to society be maximised and justice demands
that this benefit be fairly distributed. In other words, the
group in question must be given a fair chance of treatment
Y. The other, more sensible, reading of ‘available’ is that
treatment Y is not available to the group as would-be
participants who are now in contact with the experimenters.
However, in this sense, treatment Y is available to them
even if they now choose not to participate, since it is fully
within the experimenters’ power to provide it. Thus even
the modified declaration tells us that the experiment is
morally wrong.
Conclusion
Given plausible assumptions about the level of poverty
and education in the developing country targeted, the
placebo-controlled trials of the type discussed are unethical
violations of both justice and autonomy. In any case, no
moral justification can be found for the inclusion of a
placebo group. By contrast, the inclusion of a ‘no control’
group may be justified, but only when the experimenters
have not interfered with the autonomy of its members.
Experiments such as the Rakai project in Uganda are such
unethical violations of autonomy. The development of
third-world countries, in the form of economic development
and education, must be priorities that come before such
experiments.
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